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CHAPTER 9 
From Franklin to Facebook 
The Civic Mandate for Communications 
Richard R. John 
It has become a cliche to predict that the most fundamental 
innovations in information technology in the twenty-first century 
will originate in the garage of some teenage entrepreneur. While 
this prediction is intuitively appealing, it is almost certainly 
wrong. N o one can predict the future, and forecasting is noto-
riously inexact. Yet we will have a better chance of avoiding 
detours, wrong turns, and traffic jams if we have in front of us a 
road map of where we have been. 
In the past two centuries, the vast aggregations of power and 
authority known informally as "big government" have exerted 
a potent and enduring influence on communications networks 
in the United States. Three governmental institutions have 
been especially consequential: the postal system; the regulatory 
agency; and the Internet. The postal system and the Internet 
are federal institutions; regulatory agencies, in contrast, have 
derived their authority not only f rom the federal government 
but also f rom the states. Each of these institutions had its greatest 
influence in a different century: the postal system in the 1800s; 
the regulatory agency in the 1900s; the Internet today. All had 
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certain features in common. None originated in anyone's garage, 
and each was a product less of market incentives or technological 
imperatives than of political fiat. 
Communications Networks in a New Republic: 
The Postal System 
The informational environment in which we live today was by 
no means coeval with the United States. Rather, it is the product 
of more than two centuries of creative statecraft. 
The United States was born during a war of independence 
against Great Britain that began in 1775. The government was 
new; the informational environment was not. Few lawmakers 
envisioned that communications networks in the new republic 
might assume a form markedly different from those in monarchi-
cal Great Britain. All this would change in the years immediately 
following the adoption of the federal Constitution in 1788. If the 
people were sovereign, as the new Constitution proclaimed, then 
it seemed self-evident that they would need to be well informed. 
In the absence of an informed citizenry, it would be impossible to 
sustain the bold experiment in representative government that the 
framers of the federal Constitution had envisioned and lawmakers 
had sworn to sustain. 
How could lawmakers foster the creation of an informed 
citizenry? One proposal fell by the wayside: nowhere in the 
Constitution was Congress authorized to establish a national 
university. Another proposal became the opening clause of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution: "Congress shall make no 
law respecting the freedom of the speech and of the press." The 
ideal of a free press antedated the First Amendment; never before, 
however, had this ideal been enshrined in a document invested 
with the authority of fundamental law. In no sense was the First 
Amendment an expression of big government. It was, after all, a 
restraint on government power. Even so, it is worth recalling that 
it was the federal government that had restrained itself.1 
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In the twentieth century, the free press clause of the First 
Amendment would become a formidable legal weapon. In 
large part, this is because jurists interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which was adopted in 1868, to extend its juris-
diction to the states. This innovation—a triumph of big 
government—transformed the First Amendment from a con-
straint on the federal government into a constraint on govern-
mental institutions at all levels: federal, state, and local. 
Even schoolchildren know about the First Amendment. This is 
true even though, for most of the country's history, it had no dis-
cernible influence on jurisprudence: the first major constitutional 
law case to hinge on the free press clause would not be decided 
until the First World War. Yet only specialists in early American 
history have heard of the Post Office Act of 1792. This is unfor-
tunate, since the act did more than the First Amendment to create 
the informational environment in which representative govern-
ment would flourish in the nineteenth-century United States. 
The post office was not new in 1792. The facilities it provided 
for the circulation of information, however, remained almost 
entirely confined to an exclusive clientele, just as the colonial 
post office in British North America had been before the War 
of Independence. In fact, the post office that Benjamin Franklin 
had administered in 1775 as the first postmaster general for the 
rebellious American colonies was largely identical to the post 
office that Franklin had administered for many years before the 
war as a placeman for the Crown. And it was much the same 
post office that the new government had at its disposal during 
the War of Independence (1775-81), the framing of the federal 
Constitution in 1787, and the debates over the ratification in the 
winter of 1787-88. The institution had yet to be transformed 
into a system invested with a civic mandate to keep the citizenry 
well informed. All this would change with the enactment of the 
Post Office Act of 1792. 
Prior to 1792, postal administrators had been constrained both 
in theory and practice. In theory, they lacked an unambiguous 
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mandate to create post routes that lay entirely inside individual 
states and had no mandate whatsoever to facilitate the circulation 
of newspapers, then as now a major medium for the broadcast-
ing of information on public affairs. Even had such a mandate 
existed, they had good reason, in practice, to be wary of new 
departures. Interior routes and newspaper conveyance were 
expensive and could not be expected to cover their costs. Postal 
administrators were judged on their ability to balance the books: 
if they ran a deficit, they were presumed to have been derelict 
in their duty. 
Only federal legislation could break this impasse. The Post 
Office Act of 1792 transformed the informational environ-
ment in three ways. First, it created a mechanism to expand the 
route network rapidly into the hinterland; second, it admitted 
newspapers into the network at highly advantageous rates; and 
third, it established the privacy of personal communications as 
a civic ideal.2 
The mechanism that hastened the rapid expansion of the route 
network was seemingly prosaic. Instead of leaving control over 
the designation of new post routes with postal administrators, 
as had been the norm before 1792, the Post Office Act of 1792 
shifted control to Congress. This shift might sound trivial, but 
it was not. Congressmen were eager to please their constituents, 
and constituents were eager to obtain access to postal facilities. 
The consequences were profound. By 1828, the United States 
boasted the largest postal route network in the world, a fact that 
impressed European travelers like Alexis de Tocqueville, and 
that created the technical preconditions not only for the elec-
tion of Andrew Jackson, the first president to regard himself as 
a tribune of the people, but also for the flourishing of voluntary 
associations, which Tocqueville would hail as a defining fea-
ture of the democratic culture that had taken root in the United 
States. 
The communications network that lawmakers created was 
distinctive both in scale and scope. The post-1792 postal system 
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conveyed not only letters but also newspapers, the primary 
medium for the circulation of information on public affairs. Here, 
too, the critical innovation was political, and, here, too, the key 
shift was embodied in a clause of the Post Office Act of 1792. 
Lawmakers agreed that the mail should be open to anyone 
willing to pay the stiff congressionally mandated fees. For certain 
favored postal patrons these fees were waived. Lawmakers, for 
example, granted themselves the right to send an unlimited 
number of items at no cost through the network, a perquisite 
known as the "franking privilege." 
The expansion in the mandate of the postal system to embrace 
newspapers as well as letters proved to be more controversial. 
Small numbers of newspapers had circulated in the mail for 
decades, primarily through the courtesy of lawmakers who sent 
them to constituents postage-free. But this practice remained 
customary and lacked the force of law. The postal system, 
remarked one postal administrator in 1788, had been established 
"for the purpose of facilitating commercial correspondence"; 
and, as a consequence, it had, "properly speaking, no connection 
with the press."3 
The Post Office Act of 1792 put the conveyance of newspapers 
on an entirely different basis. Henceforth, every newspaper in 
the country, independent of content or place of publication, 
had the right to circulate in the mail at extremely low rates. To 
send a two-page letter from Boston to Savannah, Georgia, cost 
a merchant 50 cents in postage, a considerable sum; if, however, 
an editor sent a newspaper over the same route, the fee was a 
mere 1.5 cents. This was true even though newspapers were 
ordinarily much heavier than letters and, thus, more expensive 
to convey. 
The results were predictable. Newspapers clogged the mail 
bags. In any given year, newspapers made up as much as 95 
percent of the weight of the mail while generating no more 
than 15 percent of its revenue.4 While newspaper conveyance 
posed a challenge for postal administrators, it was a great boon 
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for ordinary Americans. For the first time it became possible 
for individuals living far from the seat of power to remain well 
informed about public affairs without having to meet in person 
with their representative. Within a remarkably short period of 
time, politicians figured out how to manipulate the new media 
by staging the artful journalistic spectacles that a later generation 
would dub "media events." 
Among the most resourceful of the many groups to take advan-
tage of the new communications network were the organizers of 
voluntary associations advocating causes ranging from temperance 
to women's rights. These voluntary associations, which often had 
a religious cast, were the first organizations to blanket the country 
with an identical message, a defining feature of "mass media."5 
One of the most notorious of these media events unfolded in 1835 
when, to the horror and consternation of the country's slave-
holders, an intrepid group of New York City—based abolitionists 
mailed thousands of unsolicited tracts to slaveholders advocating 
the immediate, uncompensated emancipation of slavery. 
The Post Office Act of 1792 transformed not only the mandate 
of the postal system but also its character. European postal admin-
istrators routinely opened correspondence to monitor subversive 
activity. These surveillance techniques were familiar to American 
lawmakers. John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and John Jay had 
each served as diplomats in Europe during the revolutionary era, 
and, while abroad, had grown accustomed to postal surveillance. 
Once the United States established its independence, lawmakers 
vowed that its government would renounce this tool of statecraft 
as a vestige of the monarchical past. Henceforth, or so the Post 
Office Act of 1792 decreed, it would be illegal for any govern-
ment official to open anyone's mail. 
The civic mandate of the postal system was broad, dynamic, and 
open-ended. Beginning in 1792, it embraced information on public 
affairs; by the 1820s, it had expanded to include information not 
only on public affairs but also on market trends; and by the 1840s, it 
had expanded once again to include information not only on public 
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affairs and market trends but also on personal matters. By 1913, with 
the advent of parcel post, it would expand even further to embrace 
the conveyance not only of information but also of goods. 
Prudent lawmakers had traditionally warned that the circula-
tion of information might threaten established institutions, and 
the United States in the nineteenth century was no exception. 
The critical issue was slavery. In much of the United States, 
slavery enjoyed the protection of a welter of state laws, and in 
those states where it remained a pillar of the economy, slave-
holders feared that the circulation of information might jeop-
ardize their livelihood. The circulation of information on the 
slavery issue had the potential not only to foment a slave rebel-
lion but also to foster public discussion. And public discussion, 
or so slaveholders feared, might persuade the non-slaveholding 
majority to renounce the "peculiar institution." 
Thomas Jefferson is often hailed as a libertarian hero. Yet it 
was Jefferson's anti abolitionist heirs who were the most adamant 
in blocking the circulation of information on the slavery issue. 
Had Jefferson lived to witness the abolitionists' mail campaign of 
1835—he had, in fact, died nine years earlier, in 1826—he, too, 
might, as a proponent of states' rights, have applauded the draco-
nian state and local laws banning the circulation of information on 
the slavery issue. In most states, these laws would remain vigor-
ously enforced until the Civil War. Only big government could lift 
this cordon sanitaire, and in the pre-Civil War period, federal law-
makers deferred to their colleagues in the states. Anti abolitionists 
feared not the First Amendment, but the informational environ-
ment that had been created by the Post Office Act of 1792. 
The First Electrical Communications Networks: 
The Telegraph versus the Telephone 
Most Americans have heard of Samuel F. B. Morse and Alexander 
Graham Bell. Each invented a technical contrivance that would 
become an essential component of an electrical communications 
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network: the telegraph for Morse, the telephone for Bell. Few 
recall that both inventors owed not only their fame but also 
their fortunes to the regulatory agency that certified their 
inventions—namely, the US Patent Office. 
The protection of intellectual property rights has since 1836 
been a key contribution of the federal government's communi-
cations policy. Beginning in that year, Congress required patent 
office administrators to certify that each new invention was, in 
fact, worthy of federal protection—a mandate that distinguished 
the American patent office f rom the British patent office and 
that helped to facilitate the remarkable spate of information 
technology innovations in the years to come.6 
Telegraph inventor Samuel F. B. Morse lobbied strenuously 
in the 1840s to persuade Congress to purchase his patent rights 
and authorize the Post Office Department to license promoters 
to operate the telegraph network. Yet Congress demurred and 
the licensing of telegraph operating companies devolved on the 
states.7 
The mail was regulated by political fiat, the telegraph by 
market competition. Instead of emulating federal lawmak-
ers and mandating rate caps and performance standards—as 
Congress had done with the Post Office Department—state 
lawmakers encouraged new entrants to challenge incumbents, 
on the assumption that market competition would encour-
age low rates and high performance standards. Antimonopoly 
became a rallying cry, with N e w York state leading the way. 
The N e w York Telegraph Act of 1848 made it easy to charter a 
telegraph company and popularized the presumption that tele-
graph managers should be free to charge whatever the market 
would bear. Similar laws were enacted shortly thereafter in many 
states. Market competition, state lawmakers assumed, was a bet-
ter regulator than political fiat, and antimonopoly a compelling 
civic ideal. 
The legacy of antimonopoly was far-reaching. Hemmed in by 
potential new entrants, incumbent telegraph operating companies 
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pursued a business strategy that was narrow and restrictive. The 
dominant telegraph network provider, Western Union, had no 
interest in providing a mass service for the entire population, as 
its president declared in testimony before Congress in 1890. If 
ordinary Americans wished to communicate over long distances, 
they could send a letter.8 The Post Office Department, buttressed 
by a civic mandate that was broad, dynamic, and open-ended, 
provided a mass service for the entire population; Western 
Union, constrained by antimonopoly legislation, remained for 
many decades the provider of a specialty service for an exclusive 
clientele of merchants, newspaper editors, and the well-to-do. 
Western Union would not recast its business strategy until 1910, 
when, partly in response to federal legislation that put telegraph 
companies under the jurisdiction of a federal regulatory agency 
and partly as a result of a change in management, telegraph man-
agers reversed course and expanded their mandate for the first 
time to provide facilities for the many as well as the few. 
The federal government played only a minor role in the 
early history of the telephone, with the major exception of 
patent rights. The first telephone exchange, which went 
into operation in 1878, was operated not by the Post Office 
Department—as Morse's first telegraph line had been in 1845— 
but by a state-chartered corporation. The first exchanges were 
highly localized, and their interconnection into a nationwide 
network took decades. Telephone inventor Alexander Graham 
Bell never lobbied Congress to establish a government telephone 
network, and in the period before 1900 few Americans, other 
than academic economists and certain frustrated business users, 
envisioned that the telephone might one day be regulated by a 
federal agency. 
The telephone and telegraph emerged in an age in which the 
scope of state regulatory agencies remained confined to the pub-
lication of financial data. Yet here the similarity ceased. Big-city 
telephone operating companies were regulated from the out-
set by city councils, which, in return for providing operating 
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i companies with the necessary licenses to string wires over busy 
! city streets, set rate caps and mandated performance standards. 
I Few cities established a designated telephone bureau to regulate 
J telephone service. Yet in all of the country's major cities, as well 
j as in thousands of towns, city councils monitored the perfor-
| mance of telephone operating companies to ensure that they 
| fulfilled their franchise obligations. 
| Franchise regulation obliged telephone managers to keep rates 
low and performance standards high. It also encouraged them to 
institute calling plans tailored to small users and to extend a 
basic level of service to underserved neighborhoods, innovations 
that both telephone managers and telephone users had initially 
resisted on account of their high cost and disruptive potential. 
Telegraph service in 1900 remained a specialty service for 
the few. Telephone service, in contrast, was well on its way to 
becoming a mass service for the many. Paradoxically, the newer 
of the two electrical communications media was popularized 
first. Big government—in the form of city-based regulation— 
helps explain why. Market incentives and technological incen-
tives cannot explain this surprising outcome; the key, rather, was 
political flat. 
The popularization of telephone service in the nation's big 
cities was risky. The construction of the switching equipment 
necessary to expand access to the network was expensive and 
the financial return uncertain. In many cities, including New 
York and Chicago, the financial extortion of telephone oper-
j ating companies by unscrupulous aldermen posed a recurrent 
j challenge. A further challenge was posed by the possibility that 
city officials might franchise a new entrant to compete with 
the incumbent. By transforming telephone service into a mass 
) service, telephone company managers captured the moral high 
ground and cultivated a political base that insulated them against 
the vicissitudes of municipal politics, 
j In 1913, the US attorney general sued the dominant telephone 
holding company, American Telephone and Telegraph, for 
L 
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illegally monopolizing the business of electrical communica-
tions. Bell had recently acquired a major financial stake in tele-
graph giant Western Union, giving it a dominant position not 
only in the telephone but also in the telegraph. To prevent the 
Justice Department lawsuit from going to trial, Bell agreed in 
the following year to sell its holdings in Western Union and 
to cooperate with the many rival non-Bell telephone operating 
companies to create an interconnected nationwide telephone 
network. This political settlement transformed the telephone 
business into the legally sanctioned cartel that it would remain 
until the Justice Department broke it up in 1984. 
The civic ideal that informed the Justice Department-Bell 
settlement was not market competition but market segmenta-
tion. Justice Department officials had no interest in atomizing 
the telephone business to revive market competition; rather, they 
built a firewall between the telegraph and the telephone business 
to discourage excessive concentrations of power. 
In the seventy-year period between 1914 and 1984, telephone 
rates and performance standards were determined not by market 
competition but by political fiat. State regulatory agencies sup-
planted city councils as the primary regulatory forum beginning 
around 1907. The telephone business in this period was highly 
stable, yet in no sense stationary. To foster research and develop-
ment in wired communications while containing the looming 
threat posed by disruptive innovations such as radio, Bell plowed 
millions of dollars into Bell Laboratories, a world leader in research 
and development that Bell established in 1925. The transistor, 
the first communications satellite, the U N I X computer operat-
ing system (a key component of the Internet), and many other 
vital components of the digital communications networks of the 
present-day United States were invented at Bell Labs. The will-
ingness of Bell to invest so heavily in research and development— 
creating what was, in effect, a national laboratory—would have 
been inconceivable had lawmakers not transformed the telephone 
business into a cartel that guaranteed Bell a steady return. 
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Communicating over the Airwaves: Radio and Television 
The cartelization of the telephone business established a 
precedent that would shape the regulation of a very different 
communications medium—namely, radio. In the Radio Act of 
1927, a cornerstone of communications policy today, Congress 
extended the principle of government ownership f rom a city's 
streets to the airwaves. To minimize the problem of frequency 
interference, a major technical challenge, lawmakers permit-
ted radio stations to license a portion of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. The spectrum itself, however, like a city's streets, 
remained public property. The self-confidence with which 
Congress claimed ownership over the airwaves was informed by 
the time-honored presumption that the federal government had 
an expansive civic mandate in the realm of communications. 
It also built on the recent public policy debate over munici-
pal franchises in transportation, communications, water, and 
energy. In this debate, municipal franchise corporations were 
recast as "public utilities," a new concept dating from the 1890s 
that would provide a template for the regulation of radio and 
television in the decades to come. 
The regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum devolved first 
upon the Federal Radio Commission, and, beginning in 1934, 
upon its successor, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC). The FCC remains the regulatory agency responsible for 
licensing radio and television stations today. N o other govern-
mental institution has done more to encourage broadcasters to 
promote the public good.9 
Had Congress established a government-owned and operated 
broadcast network comparable to the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, not only radio and television but also the Internet 
might have been more centrally administered. With the Radio 
Act of 1927, lawmakers opted instead for planned decentralization, 
creating the mixed public-private informational environment 
characteristic of American communications policy ever since. 
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The cartelization of the telephone business had the further 
consequence of blocking the establishment of a telephone-radio 
monopoly. Lawmakers wary of concentrated power repeatedly 
warned in the 1920s that Bell might use its dominant position 
in the telephone business to control radio. Radio was a new 
medium, and Bell feared that the "wireless telegraph" might 
render valueless Bell's huge investment in a wired telephone 
network. To parry this threat, Bell made a major investment 
in radio research and held a valuable portfolio of radio pat-
ents. The N B C radio network originated as a Bell subsidiary, 
and for a time, it appeared likely that Bell might become as 
well entrenched in the radio business as it had become in the 
telephone business. 
This nightmare scenario for lawmakers was forestalled when, 
in another section of the Radio Act of 1927, Congress extended 
to radio the principle of market segmentation. Telephone 
companies, Congress decreed, could own and operate the 
wired communications network over which radio signals were 
transmitted but not the radio stations that created the program-
ming. Had Bell been an ordinary business regulated by market 
competition rather than political fiat, lawmakers would have 
found it much more difficult to prohibit it f rom entering into 
this promising new market and virtually impossible to enforce 
the telephone-radio divide. 
Market segmentation is a civic ideal that lawmakers have 
repeatedly invoked to limit concentrations of power. W h e n 
Congress prevented Bell from owning radio stations, it reaf-
firmed a principle that was as old as the republic. Had market 
segmentation not been a civic ideal, the Post Office Department 
might have retained control of the telegraph in the 1840s; the 
telegraph might have retained control of the telephone in the 
1870s; the telephone might have retained control of the telegraph 
in the 1910s; and the telephone might have retained control of 
radio in the 1920s. Lawmakers have repeatedly opposed mergers 
that permit an entrenched organization to gain control of a new 
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medium, another example of the influence of governmental 
institutions on American communications. 
Communicating in the Digital Age 
The computer, like the atomic bomb, was a legacy of federal 
investment in wartime. It emerged, as did so many of the 
innovations that we take for granted today, in the hothouse of 
innovation spawned by the Second World War. The Internet was 
also a product of military mobilization, though from a slightly 
later era. It was a product of the Cold War, a four-decade-long 
smoldering conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union during which policy makers in both countries feared that 
the world might soon be devastated by a nuclear cataclysm. 
Like so many major innovations in communication— 
including radar, communications satellites, and the computer— 
the Internet originated not in some teenager's garage but, rather, 
in a government agency. Commercial considerations played 
no role in its inception, a fortunate fact, since, had commer-
cial considerations been present, they might have discouraged 
government engineers from devising protocols to facilitate 
interconnection, a defining feature of the Internet today. 
The Internet was not invented to ensure the survivability 
of American telephone networks during a nuclear attack. This 
myth, deeply entrenched in the popular imagination, is an over-
simplified and misleading explanation of a complex reality.10 Yet 
it does contain a kernel of truth. The Internet was a product of 
Cold War military planning. And, in particular, it was designed 
to speed up the calculations necessary to accurately fire inter-
continental ballistic missiles, a task that taxed the computational 
power of the nation's largest computers. 
Computational power in the 1960s was so limited that 
government scientists hit upon the expedient of linking together 
high-speed mainframe computers at universities located thou-
sands of miles apart. Mainframe computers were originally 
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self-contained; to interconnect them, government scientists had 
to invent protocols flexible enough to accommodate diversity. 
The invention of these protocols was a technical triumph. So, 
too, was the physical linkage of distant computers into a sin-
gle network. Interconnection was facilitated by the common 
assumption that the long-distance Bell telephone network had 
excess capacity, and therefore that utilizing this network to send 
messages from computer to computer was cost-effective.11 
None of the Internet-based innovations that we take for 
granted today—not Facebook, not Twitter, and not Google— 
could have emerged had the Internet been designed by a pri-
vate corporation and not a government agency. The Internet 
was a by-product not of market competition but, rather, of the 
interdisciplinary, collaborative, knowledge-based research cul-
ture of the Cold War military-industrial-academic complex, a 
culture spawned by political fiat and sustained by federal fund-
ing. Unlike even the largest and most powerful of corporations, 
the military was unconstrained by the financial considerations 
that would have limited a commercially owned and operated 
network to a narrow range of applications in a limited domain. 
In the 1960s, federal administrators seriously considered turning 
over the administration of the Internet to AT&T, an acronym by 
which Bell was commonly known. AT&T rejected the proposal, 
fearful that it might become subject to unwanted regulatory 
scrutiny. Fortunately, big government prevailed. Paradoxically, 
and to a degree that free-market fundamentalists may find 
incomprehensible, it took a huge government bureaucracy to 
invent a communications network that was flexible, decentral-
ized, and inclusive.12 
Planned decentralization is a time-honored American civic 
ideal. It shaped the design of the federal Constitution, the 
structuring of the Post Office Department following the enact-
ment of the Post Office Act of 1792, and the regulation of the 
nation's broadcast networks by the Federal Communications 
Commission. It is also a defining feature of the Internet, a 
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direct result, paradoxically, of the heterogeneity of the nation's 
mainframe computers. 
The commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s coin-
cided with a sea change in conventional assumptions concern-
ing government-business relations. For much of the twentieth 
century, lawmakers assumed that the FCC would regulate the 
nation's dominant communications networks—first the tele-
phone and telegraph, then radio and television—in accordance 
with a civic mandate enshrined in federal law. To the chagrin of 
media critics, lawmakers never funded public radio or television 
on the scale that its supporters requested or that exists today in 
Great Britain, Canada, and Scandinavia. Yet federal regulators 
did shape the programming that broadcasters created. For almost 
four decades, for example, the FCC enforced, and the courts 
largely sustained, a "fairness doctrine" that required radio and 
television stations to broadcast opposing views on controversial 
public issues. This doctrine took inspiration from the founders' 
presumption that the government had a civic mandate to pro-
vide the citizenry with access to information on public affairs. 
This mandate, the FCC ruled in 1949, overrode the broadcaster's 
right to air whatever opinions it might see fit. All this began to 
change in the 1970s, with the revival of the nineteenth-century 
faith in market competition as a civic ideal. In 1987, the FCC 
abolished the fairness doctrine, hastening the rise of the parti-
san, vituperative, and more than occasionally irresponsible radio 
and television broadcasting that is such a ubiquitous feature of 
the informational environment today.13 
Lawmakers in the years to come will continue to make basic 
decisions regarding the structure of the nation's communica-
tions networks. If current trends continue, public debate will 
be dominated by the presumption that the market is a better 
allocator of resources than the state. Lawmakers have favored 
market competition over political fiat at certain points in the 
American past. Market competition, for example, was a cor-
nerstone of communications policy regarding the telegraph, a 
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circumstance that helps explain why the telegraph, unlike the 
mail, newspapers, radio, television, or the Internet, has ceased to 
exist. Yet market competition has rarely been the norm. From 
a historical perspective, the critical issue for the lawmakers of 
today and tomorrow is not whether the federal government will 
intervene in the realm of communications. Rather, the critical 
issue is how it will intervene and on whose behalf. 
Historians make poor prophets. Still, if we are to honor the 
legacy of the founders of the republic, we would do well to 
recall that for most of our history, lawmakers presumed that they 
had a civic mandate to coordinate the nation's communications 
networks. Promotion, regulation, and innovation were the three 
primary strategies lawmakers relied on; planned decentraliza-
tion and market segmentation—and not market competition— 
were the most characteristic tools. 
In communications, big government has been not the 
exception but the rule. The informational environment we enjoy 
today owes less to the inventive genius of teenage entrepreneurs 
toiling away in their parents' garage than to the creative statecraft 
of lawmakers committed to limiting arbitrary power and sustain-
ing the informed citizenry necessary then and now to sustain the 
founders' bold experiment in representative government. 
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